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The Nazi treasuries received their income both from sources usually
accessible to governments and from extraordinary sources. Revenue
was derived from taxation, administrativeincome, income from pub-
lic property and increase in debt - the normal channels through
which part of the national income is directed to public authorities.
In addition, the Nazi government secured considerable amounts
through "voluntary" and involuntary contributions - a conglom-
eration of fees, levies, collections and contributions of all kinds im-
posed upon the population both of Germany and the occupied
territories. Finally, the governments of invaded countries were made
to pay huge amounts to cover the "cost of occupation."
As far as the system of taxation and the different types of adminis-
trative income are concerned, the Nazi government did not make
any novel or startling departure. It keptthese measures within the
limits of well-established practices of public finance. Since we are
not concerned in this study with a detailed analysis of theGerman
financial apparatus, we shall limit ourselves to describing merely
the changes in the system of taxation introduced by the Nazis. We
shall want to deal in somewhat greater detail with the methods and
techniques which they applied in increasing the public debt and in
raising funds through all kinds of "contributions" and fees. In this
they were really original and inventive.
TAXATION
The German Tax System at the Beginningof1933
The tax system existing toward the end of the Weimar Republic
was based mainly upon the so-called ErzhergerTax Reformof
1919-20. This reform transferred significant tax powersfrom the
states to the Reich and established a centralized tax policy. The
Reich, previously dependent chiefly upon customs and excise duties,
acquired authority to levy taxes on income and property (wage
tax, income tax, property tax) as well as many taxes on trade (turn-
over tax, transportation tax, motor vehicle tax, land purchase tax,
etc.). State and local authorities for the most part retained only
taxes on real estate (land and building tax) and gross business re-
ceipts (business tax). To these were added a few small consumption





























thethe tax on landlord's inflation gains(called the house-rent tax n
Prussia). In return [or the taxessurrendered, state and local authori.
ties received part of the tax receiptscollected by the Reich deljb.
erately in excess of its own requirements.They thus shared ona
percentage basis in die Reichreceipts from the income, wage, cor-
poration and turnover taxes. The entire yield of some smaller taxes
(land purchase tax, and tax on racing bets) was also turned over to
the state and local authorities after deduction of a percentage for
cost of collection.
'The principal features of this tax system remained unchanged
during the entire period from 1920 to 1933. The Erzberger Tax
Reform had been based on the principle that all potential tax
sources must be utilized. Accordingly, the new tax system left no
part of the field uncovered and later offered little opportunity for
the introduction of new taxes. The most important Reich taxes at
the beginning as well as the end of the period were: the income
tax, general property tax, turnover tax, tobacco tax and Customs
duties. The most significant additions to Reich taxes during the
period from 1920 to 1933 were: (a) the special assessment on in.
dustnal property (1924), originally levied to raise fixed annual sums
for reparation payments, and (b) the crisis tax (zi), proceeds of
which were to defray part of the unemployment burden. The mt
important addition during the same period in the local financial
system was the citizen tax (1930). The total receipts from all taxes
and customs duties rose sharply before 1929, and declined severely
during the depression. During the fiscal year 1932-33over io bil-
lion reichsmarks were collected in taxes, nearly7 billion reichsznarks
by the Reich and over3.5 billion reichsmarks by the state and local
authorities. After apportioning the funds, the Reich retained less
than half of the total tax revenue.
General Tax Measures to Increase Public Revenue,1933-39
After the Nazis seized power, they didnot change the system of
taxation to any considerableextent. The retention of the existing
tax system may be partly explained by thefact that the Nazis in-
herited a tax system ofgreat flexibility. Because of its comprehen-
siveness large additional taxrevenues would automatically accrue








were conceived at a time when Germany was confronted withan
unknown amount of reparationpayments; they were designed to
tap considerable amounts of the national income for thispurpose.
After this expenditure had been eliminated in1932, the existing
tax system was in a position to yield large amounts ofrevenue to
finance preparations for a newwar as soon as Germany would be
able to increase her national income andto curtail the outlay for
unemployment. As the financial requirements for militaryprepara-
tions increased, the "automatic" growth ingovernment revenue no
longer sufficed. Changes in the tax system becamenecessary to aug-
ment the income of the Reich government. A significant part of the
increase in tax receipts resulted from making the tax administra-
tion more effective; another part came from increases of existing.
and the introduction of new, Federaltaxes; and a third part from
changes in the tax system of state and local authorities.
(a) Improvement of Tax Administration
oms Because of the extreme power it exercisedover taxpayers, the Nazi the government could improve the effectiveness of the tax administra- 1' lion with comparative case. The Under-Secretary in theTreasury
candidly summed up the matter when he stated that theobligation
of to pay taxes was based not upon a legal relationship between the
mo5t taxpayer and the Treasury, but upon a power relationship between
DCUI the State and the people. While thegovernment under the Weimar
taxes Republic was anxious to protect the taxpayer by law against arbi-
erelY trariness of the tax administering authorities, the Nazigovernment
) bit was responsible for a systematic deterioration in the position of the
narks taxpayer in relation to the government. The taxpayer not only lost
local all influence upon tax legislation, but alsoupon the administration
l lesS of taxes which he had participated in under the Republic.The
Treasury was empowered to change tax laws by decrees and ordi-
nances, while tax lawyers and tax advisers were practically made
into an arm of the tax authorities.
m of A striking example of the Nazi attitude toward thetaxpayer is
sting found in the first paragraph of the Tax Adaptation Law of October
is in- 193448 where the following rule is laid down: "Thetax laws are to
ehen be interpreted according to the National Socialist Weltanschauung."
ccme 48 Reichsgesetzblau(1934) I. p. 925.
ystelfl
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However curious this statement may sound, it had a very special
significance. It is a general clause which gives the Collectors of In-
ternal Revenue and the courts a high degree of discretion. This
authority was used to administer tax laws to yield the greatest pos-
sible amount of revenue. Any attempt at evasion or avoidance of
tax payment, even if permissible under the law, could be thwarted.
Concealed profit distributions and secret reserves could now be
taxed. Official tax reappraisals could be arranged so as to lead to
additional burdens. In imposing penalties for tax deficiencies the
authorities were supposed to evaluate the general conduct of the
defendant as a citizen - from a Nazi point of view. Finally, this
provision enabled the tax administration to reinterpret pre-Nazi
tax laws in the interest of the Nazi State and thus to extract addi.
tional re"nue on the basis of old tax regulations. It was thusa
source of almost unlimited discretionary power.
The Reich Tax Administration was first established in i919. Dis-
organized during the inflation period, its reorganization was begun
in 1924 and had not been quite completed when the Nazis seized
power. The Nazi government made the Tax Administration, which
had been well built up by its predecessors, evenmore efficient by
increasing the personnel, improving their training, and perfecting
the system of assessment and collection. Thissystem was improved
in several ways. Accounting and bookkeeping requirementswere
made more stringent. Small businessmen,not usually forced to
keep books, were required after1935 to keep an entry book for
goods received; after 1936 the wholesale tradewas forced to record
all goods sold. These measures, in conjunctionwith the general
increase in state supervision, led toa more satisfactory determination
of actual turnover, profits, and incomes,particularly of small busi.
ness units and agriculture. The Book and PlantInspection Service
and the general inspection of factories fortax purposes, already well
developed before 1933,were further improved. The regular and
thorough inspection service of the Naziadministration resulted in
a considerable increase in tax revenue. In addition,a new real estate
inventory, introducing uniformstandards for the whole Reich,was
authorized on October i6,1934;t had not been completed when
the war started. Besides beingused for taxationpurposes, this in-
ventory formed an important basis forplanned land utilization and
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investment. Finally, entreprcneurs were required to secure a certifi-
cate of good standing from the tax authorities as aprerequisite to
receiving even small government orders. Lists of dilatory taxpayers
as well as tax penalties were widelypublicized.
(b) Increases in Tax Rates
In order tO stem the catastrophic decline in tax receipts during the
depression, various tax rates were raised and various new taxes
were introduced. Not only did the Nazi governmentmaintain most
of these tax increases and new taxe6; while revising and elaborating
some of the tax provisions, they also introduced furtherincreases in
tax rates. There was, however, more emphasis placed on manysmall
changes in tax laws than on any general increase in tax rates. A gen-
eral change in the tax rates was the increase in the rate of the cor-
poration tax. The corporation tax was raised 25 percent for 1936
(from 20 to 25 percent), and another 20 percent (from 25 to 30 per-
cent) from 1937 Ofl. A further increase was ordered for corporate
incomes over ioo,000 reichsmarks; the tax rate on them was set at
35 percent for i 938, and at 40 percentthereafter.49
Several changes were made in the personal income tax. The ex-
emption previously enjoyed by farmers was considerably reduced
in October 1934 and many more farmers became liable under the
income tax law.5° Moreover, at the beginning of 1939, additional
burdens were imposed upon single persons and childless married
couples. The rates for single persons were increased about 12½
percent; the maximum rate was raised from 50 to 55 percent.Rates
for childless couples who had been married for five years were in-
creased by about 40 percent. At the same time, the tax allowance
for the employment of domestic help was abolished, the privilege
of deducting the church tax from taxable income was cancelled, and
the lump sum exemption from the assessed income tax against ex-






















vhen Resides increasing tax rates, the Nazis introduced two new taxes to
s in increase the government's revenue, the defense tax and the income
and 49 Ibid. (1938)1, p. 952.
50 Ibid. (1934)1, p. 1005.
(c) New Taxes
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increment tax. The Defense Tax of July 20, 1937 15 a typical Nazi
tax measure.St Every German livingin the Reich who was born
after December 31, 1912 and who had not been called up for miii.
tary service became liable for paymentof this tax until he reached
the age of 45. In the first two years52 of his tax liability, the levy
amounted to 50 percent of his income tax, but it had to be equiva.
lent to at least 4 percent of his wage income, or to 5 percent of other
income; in later years, the tax rate was to be only 6 percent of his
income tax (with a minimum of.percent of his wage income and
.6 percent of other income). In i8 this tax yielded only 17 million
reichsmarks.53
On March 20, 1939, the increment income tax was introduced un-
der the New Finance Plan,54 in order to compensate in part for the
loss of tax revenue resulting from the issuance of tax credit certifi-
cates under the Plan. All persons, including corporations and wage
and salary earners, paying income tax were liable to the increment
income tax. These taxpayers were to pay to the Reich ipercent
of the excess of their income in the taxable year over the income
in the preceding year, i.e., the excess income in 1938 over the in-
come in 1937 was subject to the increment tax payable in iqg.
Taxes which did not exceed i 2 reichsmarks annually (increment in-
come 8o reichsmarks) were not collected. The tax could not be de-
ducted from income or business gross receipts in tileassessment of
income, corporation, and businessgross receipts taxes. Certain ex-
emptions were allowed. Income incrementsup to 1,200 reichsinarks
were exempt from levy. Furthermore, taxpayers whose income in
the taxable year did not exceed7,200 reichsmarks and whose in-
comes in the year preceding the taxable year did not exceed 6,000
reichsmarks were exempt from thetax.In addition to these gen-
51 Ibid. (1937) I. p.821.
52 The term of military servicewas two years.
53 Another typical Nazi taxnleasUI-c was Lax discrimination against the Jews. In
addition to greater stringency in the flight-taxwhich hit Jews almost exclusively
(revenue for 1932: .9 million rcichsmarLs; for 1938:342.6 million reichsmarks), the
Nazis used other taxes to make the Jewsa special source of government income. In
the assessment of income, property, andcitizen taxes, all exemptions and familycon-
siderations were removed for the Jews.The special assessment of Jewish property on
November 12, 1938 is another example.(See below. p. 77.)
54 Ibid. (1939) I, pp. 561 and 829.For further details, seepp. 52-55. 55 Reichsseurbj(1939) pp. 493, 617, 736.
32eral exemptions and exemptions for children, there were other in-
tricate special provisions for determining income increment.56
The income increment tax for 1939 was to be paid in three equal
instalments. On August 21, 1940, however, a decree of the Treasury
announced that the tax would apply to the assessment for the cal-
endar year i 939 only, and would not be imposed thereafter.57 A
er financial magazine stated58 that various reasons led to discontinuing
is the income increment tax. Since rationing of consumers' goods effec-
d tively regulated private consumption, the increment income tax was
no longer needed to absorb consumer purchasing power. Similarly,
it was no longer needed to absorb excess profits, since profits during
66 For families with several children the basic exemption of 1.200 reichsmarks was
increased by 900 reichsmarks for the third and each succeeding child. A married man
with four children, therefore, was exempt from the increment income tax if his
income in the taxable year did not exceed 9,000 reichsmarks (6,000 plus 1.200 plus
2 x 900 reichsmarks). The exemption of 1.200 reichsrnarks and the additional exemp-
tion for children were applied without regard to the size of the income increment.
Of the variety of deductions permissible in arriving at taxable income increment.
the following were the most important. (I) Income derived from agriculture and
forestry was exempt from tax. Furthermore, any decline in income from these sources
was deductible from the total income increment of those filing returns for income
from other sources.(2) Income increment could be reduced by an amount equal to
extraordinary income attributable to the taxable year. Extraordinary income was
defined as income derived from work extending over several years. or income from
the sale of a business, etc. (3) Special income from inheritances, gifts, and other
increases in wealth which occurred in the taxable year, dowries, lotteries, etc., were
not counted as part of income increment. Special income, however, was exempt only
to the extent that this income did not exceed income from other sources in the year
preceding the taxable year. (4) Amounts spent in the taxable year for necessary
enlargements of capital equipment were deductible from the income increment. The
net amount deductible was equal to the total amount of such expenditures minus
regular depreciation for income tax purposes. "Necessary enlargement" meant an
enlargement resulting in an increase of production in the plant; it did not include
replacements and repairs. This deduction was not permitted if the entrepreneur was
recciling some direct or indirect subsidy. (5) The increase in income automatically
accruing to a wage and salary earner because of seniority, promotion, or an increase
in his family was not counted as income increment. (6) The additional depreciation
allowances permitted to holders of tax certificates issued under the New Finance Plan
were also deductible from income increment. (7) The income tax law permittedthe
deduction in any one year of the loss suffered in the two preceding years. When this
provision gave rise to an income increment which was higher than would otherwise
have been the case, the amount of income before deducting losses of preceding years
was taken as the base. (8) Certain extraordinary circumstances, such asliquidation of
a household, change in fiscal year, or shift in taxliability status, which might have
unreasonably increased the income increment were to be dealt with flexibly.
$7 Reichsgesetzblatt (1940) I, p. 1130.






















the war were being kept withincertain limits through pricecontrol
and cost accounting regulation.Moreover, the assessment of the
tax had caused greatadministrative difficulties.
(d) Changes in State and Local Taxes
The Nazi government attempted to reservefor the Reich thegreat-
est possible portion of anyincrease in tax revenue that occurred
after 1932. State and local authorities were consequently kept as
short of funds as possible. They were not permitted to increase taxes
too much lest they encroach uponthe tax revenue of the Reich.
For that purpose, the Reich took over the administration of some
state and local taxes. At the same time state and local authorities
were prevented from keeping taxes toolow lest great discrepancies
in the tax burden develop among individual states and among in.
dividual local governments. The Decree Concerning Municipal Re.
serves of May 5, 1936 dealt with this problem. Every local govern-
ment was required to establish an operating reserve, an equalization
reserve, and, under certain circumstances, additional special re-
serves. So long as the minimum requirements for these reserves were
not reached, taxes, fees, and contributions levied by the local gov.
ernments could not be reduced. Reserves so formed were consider-
able and were usually invested in Reich securities.
The Reich consistently increased its own income at the expense
of the state and local authorities after 1934 by reducing transfers to
them from Reich taxes. The revenue of the state and local authori-
ties from Reich transfers increased very little after 1934, in spite of
the fact that the total receipts of the Reich rose sharply in these
years. Consequently, the percentage of total Reich receipts trans-
ferred to state and local authorities declined rapidly during the
period, fromi percent in '94-3to i6 in 1q8-3q. Since the out-
break of war the share of the state and local authorities in totaltax
receipts has further declined.
Tax Measures for Specific Economicor Military Purposes
In a controlled economy, direct interventionby the government
often makes it less importantto use taxation as an instrument of
economic control, suchas regulation of consumption, distribution
of income, capital formation,and avoidance of inflation. Insofar as















did so either to stimulateemployments or to encouragethe growth
of popuIatiofl or tofacilitate rearmament.We shall not deal here
with the tax measurestaken to stimulateemployrneflt which were
adopted in the first periodof Nazi rule and whichconstituted on the
whole more liberaldepreciation provisions in casesof expenditure
for capital equipment.
The purposes behindthe tax measures tostimulate population
growth and to facilitaterearmament were onthe whole the same;
they were prompted bythe Nazie1tanschauuflgon militaryaffairs
that they were meant to serve,the latter in the "shortrun," and the
former in the "longrun." Both sets ofprovisions were fairlysimple.
To facilitate marriagesand to encourage largefamilies, taxes were
reduced (October 1934)for those who wereprolific.59 Tax reduc-
tion for dependents wasaugmented under the wage,assessed income,
and inheritance taxes,and introduced for theproperty and citizen
taxes. When anincrease in the assessedincome and wage taxes was
considered necessary in 19,it was applied only tosingle persons
and childless couples.The reduction in theunemployment aid tax
in March 1934 - theonly basic tax reductionof the Nazi govern-
ment - consistedalmost exclusively ofvarious exemptions for mar-
ried couples with children.60
Most of the tax measureswhich had a directbearing upon re-
armament had someconnection with theproblem of self-sufficiencY.
Some of the many stepswhich the N an governmenttook to increase
Germany's independencein agriculturalcommodities were changes
in the tax system:61the agricultural land tax wasreduced in Sep-
tember 1933 for one yearby about 25 percent;the turnover tax on
agricultural commodities wasreduced from 2 to 1 percent;in April
1933 a tax of 50reichsmarks per 100 kilograms waslevied on mar-
garine artificial fats,vegetable fats, and hardenedblubber.62 This
tax wasdesigned to reduce theconsumption of margarineand
enable the government toimprove the price paidfor butter to the
59 Rcichsgeselzblatt (1934) 1, pp.1005. 1052, 1056.
60 Ibid. (1934) 1. p. 235. Thereduction, effective April 1934,brought about (a) total
exemption of all married personswith three or more children,(b) total exemption
of all married personswith one or two childrenand monthly incomes ofless than
500 reichsmar'kS, (c) totalccemptiOfl of single personsand married couples without
children with monthly incomesunder 100 reichsmarks, and(d) certain reductions in
the general rate schedule.
61 Ibid. (1933) i.p. 651.
62 ibid. (1933)1. p. 206.
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farmers at the expense of the imported raw materials necessary for
the production of margarine.
Tax laws affecting firms producing substitute (Ersatz) conimoiji.
ties were enacted as early as July 1933 when the Treastirv em-
powered to exempt from Reich and state income, corporation, tu.
over, property, business, and land taxes,partly or wholly, thosepro-
ducers who were engaged (i) in the development of new metho
of pToductiOfl or (2) in the production of new types of commodities
provided the exemption seemed advisable for the good of the whole
German economy. The tax exemption was to apply only inso
as turnover, income, and the like resulted from operations pertain-
ing to the development of new methods, etc.; furthermore, thisex-
emption was not to lead to direct competition with enterprises estab-
lished in Germany before the enactment of this tax law. An official
source indicates that these provisions were applied quite frequently
during the second Four Year Plan.e4 Import duties were also used
to encourage synthetic production of various products. In thecase
of rubber, an important duty of 125 reichsmarks per ioo kilograms
was imposed upon raw rubber in May 1937. With a fall in the world
price of rubber the duty was increased to 170 reichsmarks in March
1938. The proceeds were used to expand investments for synthetic
rubber (Buna) production.0
Other tax measures assumed to help rearmamentwere concerned
with the problems of transportation and storage. Thegreat signifi-
cance of motorized equipment for modern warfare was recognized
by the Nazis at a very early date. Production ofautomobiles was
consequently encouraged. From April1933 on, all new motor
vehicles were exempted from themotor vehicle tax.0 But in later
years this exemption was offset by severalnew automobile duties
which did not affect production directly.Import duties and com-
pensatory taxes on petroleum, gasoline, andgrease were raised in
1936, in part to aid in financing theconstruction of Reich super
highways. Also in 1936, thetransportation tax, which the railroad
passengr and freight traffic had borne foryears, was extended to
include the trafficon buses and trucks.67
u ibid. (1933) 1. p. 491.
$4Dr Vierjahrsplan (1939)p. 7.
$6Wochenberwht des lnstiluts fürKonjunli:uqorschung (August 4. 1957)p. 174. 6$Reichsgese:xblau (1933) 1, p. 192.














Several measures were introduced to encourage the accumulation
of stocks of certain goods. For instance, the technique in applying
the turnover tax to wholesale trade was changed. The old law con-
cerning the turnover tax provided for complete tax exemption for
the wholesale trade when it resold goods without storing them, and
full liability for the tax (2 percent) when it stored the goods. In
the turnover tax law of October i6, 1934 the distinction was abol-
ished and a rate of .5 percent was imposed on the entire wholesale
trade. In addition, complete tax exemption was granted to wholesale
trade in cotton, wool, metals, oil, coal and other raw materials im-
portant to rearmament.
Tax Policy Since the OutbreakofWar
No fundamental changes were necessary in tax legislation and tax
policy when the "defense" economy became a war economy in Sep-
tember1939.The distribution of the various types of taxes between
Reich, state and local authorities remained unchanged. War tax
policy was at first based on the War Economy Decree of September
orid 4, It was clearly the purpose of this Decree to curtail as much
arch as possible the expenditure of private and public funds wherever it
etic was not essential for the war effort. In order to curtail private con-
sumption, existing taxes were drastically increased; in order to cur-
ed tail the use of public funds, the states, the local authorities, and
gnifi- other public institutions were compelled to transmit to the Reich
lied an even larger part of their revenue from taxes.
was The War Economy Decree introduced three different tax meas-
owl ures. A surtax was imposed upon the income tax. This surtax
later affected all incomes over 2,400 reichsmarks. including wage earners
uties and excepting corporations.' The surtax amounted to 50 percent of
corn- the regular income tax, but could not exceed ipercent of the tax-
in payer's income. The regular income tax and war surtax combined
uper- could not exceed 65 percent of the taxpayer's income.'0 Wage and
iroad salary earners were exempt from the war surtax if their income did
ed to
174.
£8 Ibid. (1959)!, p.1609.
Ilbid. (1939) p. 1613.
70 Another change in the income tax law affected the assessment of capital gaini.
The inclusion of capital gains as taxable income was suspended in 1959, shortly before
the outbreak of war (ibid., 1959.. P. 1316). Effective January 1, 1941. capital gains
were again to be taxable income under the income tax law (Bank-A rchiv, January 1,
1941, p. 26).
37not exceed 234 reichsmarksmonthly, or 54 weekly, or 9 daily. The
surtax was paid at the sourceby wage and salary earners. A surtax
alcoholic beverages and tobacco goods;71and states, local authori..
ties, and diverse public andquasi-public institutions had to pay
"war contributions" of a varied nature tothe Federal Treasury.72
These war contributions were veryconsiderable.73
No further changes were made in tax legislation until about two
years after the outbreak of war. InAugust 1941, a dividend tax was
introduced. However, since its primary purpose was not to raise
revenue, but to prohibit "excessdividends," we have dealt with jt
in discussing developments in the capital market.74 At about the
same time, a war surtax of 25 percent wasdecreed on the existing
corporation tax75 which had not been touched by tile surtax on in-
comes ordered in the original War Economy Decree; the surtaxes on
tobacco goods and some alcoholic beverages were increased from the
original 20 to 50 percent of their retail prices and some stamp duties
were repealed.76 New developments in tax legislation came after
about another year, in tile spring and summer of 194The surtax
on the corporation tax was raised from 25 to 35 percent for corporate
incomes above one-half million reichsmarks. Some provisions of the
income tax law, for example concerning working wives, were lib-
eralized; tile tax on landlord's inflation gains was abolished by corn-
7' Reichsgesetzblatt (1939) 1. pp. 1615, 1762, 2267; see also Halbjahresberichtemr
IVirtscha/tslage (1939-40) No. 2, p. 133.
72 These contributions were ordered as follows: (a) by the states, and additional 15
percent of their share in the yield from income, corporation, and turnover taxes;
by the local communities, 25 percent of the yield from the laxon agricultural
enterprises, 5 percent of the yield from the tax on real estate, 7.5 percent of the yield
From the business receipts tax, and 10 percent of the yield from the citizen'stax;
by other public and quasi-public institutions entitled to levy taxes, fees,etc., a
contribution fixed by the Treasury to the Reich. Includedamong these organizations
were the Organization of Industry, the Reich Food Estate, the Labor Front. the Social
Insurance Institutions, etc.
78 In 1940-41, the "war contribution" by the local authoritiesamounted to 1.25
1)1111011 reichstnarks (Bank for International Settlements,Eleventh Annual Report,
1941, p. 112).
74 See pp. 20-23.
75 Economist (1941) p. 654. The 25percent surtax was supposed to produce 1 billion
reichsmarks annually (Bank for InternationalSettlements, Twelfth Annual Report,
1942, p. 119).
76Econo,nt (1941) p. 654.
77 H. W. Singer, "The German War F.conoiny,"VI and VII. Economic Journal (1942)
pp. 202 and 397-98.
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Ipounding it into a capital debt of the landlords;78 the citizens tax
was merged with the regular income tax; and the slaughter tax was
rescinded.
BORROWING
In a speech on February 8, 1942, the Secretary of the German Treas-
ury is said to have declared that "the financial and credit policy of
the Reich had never been reduced to a dogma, but it seized the most
favorable moment to find money necessary for the prosecution of
the war, wherever it was to be found."These remarks may well be
taken as a description of the ever-opportunistic borrowing policy of
the Nazi government before the outbreak of war, as well as after.
With an eye on conditions in the money and capital markets, tile
government borrowed money "wherever it was to be found," Its
specific methods at any given time were conditioned by the existing
credit situation, but this did not mean that its attitude toward the
credit situation was passive, that the government was resigned to
accepting conditions in the money and capital markets as given and
beyond control. Far from it. The financial sector, like the rest of the
economy, was harnessed to the needs of themilitary program, and
the government did not hesitate to take steps to prepare the money
and capital markets for playing an ever-larger role in providing
necessary funds.
During the entire period from1933on, the question of the aggre-
gate amount to be borrowed at a given time wasscarcely affected
by any of the traditional financial considerations usually associated
with expressions like "sound finance" or "the financial strength of
the Reich." Instead, the decision as to the volume of new borrowing
was dependent upon the sizeof the "public works" and armament
program, which, in turn, was plannedin accordance with the ulti-
mate military objectives of the governmentand the amount of physi-
cal resources available. In the beginning, when the Nazis wereprob-
ably not yet fully aware of how much of a burden the moneyand
credit system could safely carry, and when they were still seriously
concerned about public opinion at home and abroad, it is quite pos.
sible that financial considerations did, to some extent,impede actual
expansion. Their success in this area, after they completelyfreed
78 For discussion, see pp. 58-59.
'19 New York Times (February 9. 1942).
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themselves of all the usual financial inhibitions, indicates that the
money and credit system of a complex modern economy can be sub..
jected to much greater strains than has hitherto been generally be-
lieved. The break with the traditional attitude on government bor..
rowing found expression in a law passed in February193580which
authorized the Treasury "to borrow funds in amounts to be de-
termined by the Reich Chancellor upon the suggestion of the Treas-
ury." Whereas the constitution of the Weimar Republic hadau-
thorized government borrowing on the whole for investmentpur-
poses only and had sought to restrict it by making it dependent upon
special legislation, the Treasury was now given a completely free
hand, the only limitation being the formality of requiringan au-
thorization from the Reich Chancellor. There wereno other re-
strictions of any kind; special legislation for new loans ceasedto be
necessary.
While the extent of government borrowing wasno longer a matter
of great significance and study, the financial authoritiesdevoted
much attention to determining the nature and types ofnew govern..
ment obligations. They showed great versatility in devising various
new short-term borrowing instruments called tax remission certifi-
cates, work-creation bills, special bills, special types of Treasury
certificates, Treasury delivery bills,tax credit. certificates, Anny
promissory notes, and Credit Officenotes. Some were rediscountable
at the Reichsbank, some were acceptable onlyas collateral against
lombard credit from the Reichsbank,some were renewable and
some enjoyed special tax privileges andeven legal-tender qualities.
The techniques employed by the Nazis inthe six-year period before
the outbreak of war varied withchanging economic conditions,
particularly with changes in the volumeof unemployment and in
the extent of unused capacity.In the early years, especially the first
two, the government reliedvery largely upon credit expansion
through the Reichsbank andcommercial banks. Later, it borrowed
increasing amounts of the fundsaccumulated by business organiza-
tions, and by institutionaland private savers,as it tried to keep
down the ever-rising volumeof credit expansion. Whenwar was
declared, the only significantchange in the methods of borrowing
was an increasing dependenceupon short-term financing.
The money market becamevery liquid after the Nazis embarked
8OReichsgesetzbiatg (1935) I,p. 198.
40upon their rearmament program. After carefully preparing the
capital market, the government took advantage of this new liquidity
to supplement its short-term borrowing policy by a series of long-
term loans. Floated at41/2percent, the interest rate which the Nazi
government had uniformly established in the prewar period for
nearly all long-term debts in the economy, these loans cost the gov-
ernment more than the short-term issues. Not until after the out-
break of war did the government further reduce the interest Tate
on new long-term government bonds.
It is impossible to obtain complete information concerning the
extent of borrowing by the Nazi government, or the methods it
employed. The discussion that follows is based on whatever mate-
rial is available. Four different periods are distinguished:(i) The
period from the beginning of the Nazi administration until about
1935, during which there was a gradual decline in the large number
of unemployed and the mounting government deficit was covered
by short-term loans.(2)The period from 1935 until ig8 during
which the economy was approaching practically full employment.
In this period the Nazis were able to consolidate some of their
previously contracted short-term debts into long-term loans, but at
the same time continued to increase their short-term indebtedness.
() The peTiod from 1938 until the outbreak of war, a periodof full
employment during which the Nazis deemed it necessary to employ
special financial methods (in addition to continuing the short-term
borrowing and consolidation loans) lest inflationary tendencies be.
come uncontrollable. () The war period propercharacterized by
the continual placement of huge long- and short-term loans and by
the exploitation of the resources of the occupied foreign territories.
The Period of Short-Term Financing, 1933-35
When the Nazis seized control, they found the capital market too
demoralized to finance government deficits through the sale of long.
term bonds. Since the market recovered very slowly,81 theycovered
the entire budgetary deficit of the first two years through short-term
borrowing. Their first short-term instruments, the tax remission
certificates (Steuergutscheine) and the work-creation bills (A rbeits-
beschaffungswechsel)1 had been contrived by their predecessors.
The tax remission certificates were originally introduced in Sep.
$1Vkzteljahrshefte zur Konjunkurforschung, Vol.9 (1934) A. pp. 11-12.
41tember 1932 as part of the 'on Papen Plan for combating the de-
pression.82 To stimulate private enterprise by lowering the taxes
which were considered to inhibit production, and at the same time
to avoid sacrificing the revenue they yielded, the government col-
lected taxes as usual but issued tax remission certificates, whicl
could be converted into cash immediately or held as credit for
future tax payments. Those who paid the business tax, theturn-
over tax and the land-and-building tax received such certificates in
an amount equal in value to 40 percent of their payments between
October i, 1932 and September 30, 1933, and those who paid the
transportation tax received certificates equal to ioo percent of their
payments during this period.
Earning 4 percent annually, these tax remission certificatescould
be used for payment of all Federal taxes and customs (exceptcor-
poration and income taxes) due in the fiscal years i to 193819,
in an amount each year equal to 20 percent of the total valueof
certificates issued. In other words, for each,000 reichsmarks certifi-
cate, 208 reicbsmarks would be accepted for tax payments afterone
year, 216 reichsmarks after two years, 224 after three years, etc. Tax-
payers who preferred cash immediately could sell their certificates
on the Stock Exchange and use the proceeds as they saw fit.
It was expected that the certificates would havea high market
value because in addition to their annualreturn ofpercent they
were to be treated as first-class paper, they could be usedas col-
lateral against loans, and the Reichsbankwas permitted to redis-
count them up to 7percent of their market value. To insurea
strong demand for them, a consortium of bankswas organized to
purchase the certificates from the holderswith notes provided for
the purpose by the Reichsbank. Aninsignificant part of the total
amount of certificates issued was used inconnection with another
phase of the Papen Plan, namely thepayment of a subsidy (of 400
reichsmarks a year per man)to employers who could prove that
they had employedmore men from October 1, iq,to September
30, 1933 than in the period from Juneto August 1932. This subsidy
scheme was discardedas of March 31. i
The workcreation billswere the most important of the short-
term bills employed by the Nazis.They were used firstto finance
$2 Reichsgese:zblait (1932) I,p. 425.



































public works and later armaments, and were specially designed to
circumvent limitations imposed by conditions existing at the be-
ginning of 1933.84 At the time, the commercial banks were in no
position to make the necessary short-term credit available. Their
portfolios were full of frozen credits. They were extremely non-
liquid and heavily in debt to the Reichsbank. The Reichsbank, on
the other hand, restricted at that time by its own statutes, could
neither discount bills on behalf of the government, nor pursue an
active open-market policy. Since, however, it could discount coni-
mercial bills, the work-creation bill was devised. This bill, after
passing through certain prescribed channels, became acceptable as a
"commercial bill" eligible for discount at the Reiclisbank.
Work-creation bills performed their short-term financing func-
tion in the following manner.85 States, provinces, counties, munici-
palities, and other authorized public and quasi-public agencies
ordered houses, roads, etc., from private contractors, who drew bills
of exchange against them for the amount of the contract. After be-
ing endorsed by the ordering agency, these bills were presented for
acceptance to special publicly-owned financial institutions. Once
accepted by any of these financial institutions, they were ti rated as
commercial bills and could be discounted at the Reichsbank. Just
as ordinary commercial bills are supposedly "secured" by com-
modities in theTOCCSS of production or sale, so these new bills were
secured by the obligation of the Reich to redeem them within a
specified time period which varied from project to project but never
exceeded five years.88 The Reich emphasized this obligation by de-
positing special guarantees, tax remission certificates, or work-
creation debentures with the Reichsbank.
By 1935 the expenditures on work creation openly became part
of the armament program. Before March of that yeac most of the
84 The work-creation bills were originally introduced to finan.e von Schleicher's
Urgency Program for the expenditure of 500 million reichsmar!s on roads, housing.
public utilities, and inland water transportation.
85 The mechanism is well described in Adolf Friedrichs. "Die Finanzierung der
Arbeitsbcschaffung." Bank-A rchiv Uanuary 1. 1934) pp. 134 if.
8$ The bills were drawn for three months, but being renewable nineteen times,
they took on the character of medium-term paper. When the bills matured, the
Reich - not the municipalities or other agencies - paid them. Rut the ultimate
liability rested with the ordering agencies which owned the public works financed
through the work-creation bills. It was a long-term liability to the Reich for the
amounts originally financed by the short-term mechanism of the work-creation bills.
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rearming had taken place under a veil of official secrecy,but after
Germany reintroduced military conscription in 15, militaryprep.
arations were carried out openly and with great zeal. Thepublic
works program gradually gave way to theconstruction of airfields
barracks, and munitions factories, whichwere financed by short-
term paper very similar to work-creation bills, but calledspecial
bills (Sonderwechsel). They were six-month bills whichcould be
issued by any government department forpayment of contracto
were discountable by the Reichsbank at its official rate ofpercent,
and were renewable. No limit was placedupon the number ofre-
newals that could be made.
The guarantee posted by the Reich in thecase of work-creation
bilisand its direct liability in thecase of special bills meant that all
these bills were art addition to the short-term publicdebt. Theycon-
stituted government liabilities to either theReichsbank or thecom-
mercial banks, but the Reich's budgetaryand accounting procedure
failed to include them as part of the declaredpublic debt. The Ger-
man government was obviously reluctantto make its short-tenn
debt known, probably because it didnot want to risk disturbing
public confidence, and also becausea large part of the debt servedto
finance rearmament, theextent of which the governmentwas anx
ious to keep secret. The publishedfigures of the Reich didnot con-
sider the short-term debtan obligation of the government untilthe
year it fell due.81 Since only 20 percent of thework-creation bills fell
due each year, the figurespublished during the first fewyears of the
Nazi administration failedto record a large perccntage of thework-
creation bills as wellas all of the special bills.
The work-creation and specialbills proved, in additionto inter-
est-bearing Treasury certificatesand non-interest-bearingTreasury bills, an effectivemeans of utilizing the short-termmoney market
to finance the public works andrearmament program until sucha
time as recourse to long-termloans became feasible.But even after long-term capitalwas more readily available, the Naziscontinued to
use these short-term bills. TheLeague of Nationssuggests that until i98 the issue of specialbills was the "principalmeans of financing





































Germanys armament and othercapital expenditures"and the
Reichs.Kredit.GeSelLSchaft calls theperiod From '9to April1938
"the phase of the 'special'bills."89Oulicial figures ott the amountof
special bills issued were nevermade public. Private estimates vary
widely.90
The Period of "DebtConsolidation," 1935-38
The financing of the governmentdeficit through short-termbills
was viewed by theNazi government as a temporaryexpedient made
necessary by the conditionof the German capitalmarket when they
seized control.9' As a preliminary stepin the movement to revivethe
capital market, appropriate officialNazi sources repeatedlydeclared
that any idea of a forced conversioninto longer-term issues orlower
interest rates had beenunequivocally rejected.92
Then followed a series of measuresdesigned to increase general
confidence, reduce the long-terminterest rate, and prepare thecapital
market for the eventualabsorption of large government issues.The
most important of these were:the Law concerning theconversion
of short-term internalmunicipal debts of September21,3933,93
which provided for theconsolidation into long-termmunicipal issues
and the reduction of interest rates onmunicipal debts, previously a
"critical source of uncertainty";the change in the ReichsbankLaw
of October 1933 whichempowered the Reichsbank to supportthe
88League of Nations, Money and Banking1938-39, Vol. II, p. 81.
89 ReichsKreditGCSel15Ch3ft, op. cit., p.42.
90 The League of Nations (op. cit.)records some of the estimates. Noestimate of
the total amount of specialbills in circulation at the end ofMarch 1938 is reliable.
however, for the available bankingstatistics do not permit the separationof special
bills from genuine commercialbills, work-creation bills, and othershort-term paper.
91 The Wochenbericht des instilutsfür KonjunkturfOrsChuflg(English edition,
July 1, 1936. p. 55) emphasizedthat "the government has alwaysmade it clear that
the intermediate short-termfinancing of employment creation was tobe considered
as the premature useof future capital and that atgiven times the short-term debts
were to be funded. sothat the principles of soundfinance policy would not be
neglected."
92
Germany's Economic Situation at theTurn of1933-34,
p. 50. Asearly as June 1934. The(London) Banker assured its readersthat "the
attitude of the new (Nazi) regimetowards the banks proved to beless hostile in
practice than had been espected. ... Therevolutionary proposals for thenationaliza-
tion of banks and the abolition orcompulsory reduction of interest rateshave not so far
been made operative and there seemsto be no likelihood oftheir adoption" (p. 185).
93 Reichsgesetzblatt (1953) I, p.647.
94 Reich .Kredit.CeSellS4hafI. op.cit., p. 50.
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bond market by engaging in open-market operations; and the Law
concerning the credit system of December 4 1934, one of the pur.
poses of which was to obligate and to encourage the commercial
banks to hold larger portfolios of government bonds by making
these eligible for use as legally required reserves. It was hoped that
the resulting increase in demand would favorably affect the market
for government securities. After these preparations, thegovernment
proceeded to convert all pre-Nazi issues into securities bearing lower
interest rates, and to consolidate its own short-term debts.onver.
sion laws enacted on January 24, 1935 and February 27. 193595
placed all public and quasi-public bonds on a 4½ percent basis in.
stead of the previous 6 percent. These conversions not only func.
tioned as part of a general plan to reduce interest rates andthus
ease the interest burden in tile economy, but they also playeda
part in preparing the capital market for the consolidation of the
outstanding short-terni indebtedness of the Reich.
The Nazi government was now prepared to consolidate itsown
short-term indebtedness, a task made easier by the virtualban, dis-
cussed earlier, that was placed on all private loans. Thefirst long.
term loan for the purpose of consolidating the short-termwork.
creation bills was floated in January1935, concurrently with the
public conversion operation of1935. The loan consisted of 41/2
percent bonds which were taken up by the Union of SavingsBanks
and the Clearing Bank Association (DeutscheGirozentrale) at 98%
and were to be repaid within 28years.The second great con-
solidation action was taken in Sçptember1935 under the same con
ditions as the previous issue. Besidesthe savings and clearing banks
which again took over part of the loan,the private insurance institu-
tions had pledged themselvesto invest part of their newly acquired
funds in the Reich consolidationissue. And for the first time,a
portion of tile loan was directlyoffered to the public in theopen
market. The loan was oversubscrjbed,97
These two "consolidation"loans set tilePattern For many further
issues which followed eachother in quick succession. But foronly a
95 Reichsgesetzblajt (1935) 1.pp. 45, 286.
96 lVochenbenchg des InslilutsJur Konji:nkturforschung (January30. 1935) pp 16-17.





















Limited period were some of the issues offered forpublic subsdip-
don. The government came to rely more and more oninstitutional
savers for the purchase oflong-term issues until appeals to the public
were completelydiscarded late in 1938. From a political point of
view it probably seemed wise to avoidloaii-drives and public discus-
TABLE 1 - REICH LOAN IssuEs, 1935 TO AUGUST1939
(in millions of reichsmarks)
Issues
Amount
Total Amount PubliclyYears to Maturity
issued Offered at issue Date
Sources: Reichs.Kredit-GeSCllSChaft, Germany'sEconomic Situation at the Turn a!
1938-39, p. 92, and Wirischaf t und Statistik(1939) pp. 244, 448, 729.
sion and to channel private savingsinto the large capital-accumulat-
ing institutiOnS. The governmentobviously considered this pattern
very successfuland, as we shall see later,98employed it cxci usively
during the years of war.
Table i shows that during the1935-38 period there was a pro-
gressive increase in the rate of whatthe Nazis called consolidation;










1935 500.0 500.0 10
1936 Series 1 98.0 10
1936 Series 11 700.0 500.0 12
1936 Series III 600.0 500.0 12
1937 Series 1 700.0 600.0 12
1937 Series 11 800.0 700.0 15
1937 Series III 850.0 750.0 15
1938 Series I 1400.0 950.0 18
1938 Series II 1966.0 1200.0 20
1938 Series lii 1850.0 1200.0 20
1938 Series IV 1600.0 1600.0 20
Debt Certificate Loans
1935 4 percent 264.1
1936 4% percent 56.7
Reich Railway Bonds
1936 4% percent 500.0 500.0 8
TOTAL 17,856.3 8,900.0riot uniy did the loansincrease in sii.e horn mtue to issue, but they
were floated at closerjntcrals At the bamC lime Iflatunues tended
to lengthen. Theincreasing liquidity of the rnonei and cap
markets during the period of consoJidatiormust be understooij
part of the general picture ofexpanding economic acthit. Among
the many factors wntributing to thisliquidit''ere the large cx-
penditures of the gorernuient and the einpk'yinent of large a1m)un
of discountable short-term bills, which, taken together, inij
the cich resources of business and the commercial hanlAt the
same time there were large additions tosavings deposjts, iflsure
premiums, and the sums collected by the social insurance fund, all
attributable to the great increase tn emplovmt'nL Nazi statistj
place the total of long- and medium-termperent Reich loam
and Treasury bonds floated from the beginning ofgUntil the
outbreak of war at about 17.9 billion reichsmarks. of which about
8.g billion reichsmarks were offered for public subscription and
the rest placed directly with insurance instituicn. savings banks,
other financial houses, and (since the fall oi ici, with local and
municipal reserve funds.
Since the total bill holdings of the German banks, including the
Reichsbank, continued to increase during the period of consolida.
tion, it is apparent that the medium- and lomz-term consolidation
issues "consolidated" the public debt of German' only in the sense
that, without than, the issuance of short-term bills would have in-
creased even more than it actualldid. Although the available
statistics do not separate the special bills and work-creation bills
from the private commercial bills, the League of Nations indicates
that "it is generally believed that, as a result of the crowing liquidity
of private business, the latter (private commercial bills have gieady
decreased in importance sinceigi and have come to constitute only
a minor pornon of the total." On this bci it is suggested that "the
consolidation loans have been,on balance, an additional source for
"For a detailed and instructive diajjnof the efiecoi thc vrous ao1ida'
uon iues upon mone andcapitalmaitcu., se WilL Sdjni±:nd Vicioi Wiede.
"LcEOlidierung und krediunethanjsmus' tyakycnrL( :i- W:r,:PieforschwIg
{193) pp.405 fi.
1% Reilis-Lredit-Gell,ctiaft £eonow 1irio the .Middle o
the Fe&i- 1939, p. 44.
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covering current expenditure rather than a means of actually con-
solidating - and therefore reducing - the floating
The Period of Maximum Mobili2ation, 193 8-39
The preceding section indicated that in spite of large consolidation
issues from1935to 1938 the Nazi government had to meet a con-
siderable part of its deficit by means of short-term financing through
the banking system, largely in the form of special bills. In the early
part of 1938, however, the approach of the economy to full capacity,
M the and the resulting fear of inflation in many quarters, led to a change
in policy.102 Before the annual meeting of the Reichsbank on March
3n II, 1938, its President outlined the new course to be followed. The
financing of armaments by special bills was to be discontinued as of
the beginning of the new fiscal year, April 1, 1938; thereafter public
funds were to be obtained from current revenues (taxes and cus-
toms) and from long-term loans on the capital market. To the Reichs-
bank was assigned the task of "working off" the volume of special
bills not already in its possession.
As soon as the bills in the hands of commercial banks and private
individuals fell due (it will be recalled that they were six-month
bills), the Reichsbank redeemed them out of funds provided by the
issue of "block bills" (Blockwechset) and 'sola bills" (Solawechsel).
Block bills were certificates issued by the Reichsbank in exchange
for large blocks of maturing special bills. Running for the most part
between three and twelve months, renewable, carrying an interest in
- June 1939 ranging frompercent for three-month bills to9/16
percent for twelve-month bills, they were held largely bythe corn-
rnercial banks. There is no information concerning the amount of
block bills issued. The solas were three-month bills issued since 1935
by the Gold Discount Bank, a subsidiary of the Reichsbank, inorder
of the commercial banks and at the same time to obtainfinancial
to provide a profitable temporary investmentfor the excess funds
means for the purchase ofwork-creation bills which often accumu-
lated at the Reichsbank. Since both the sola bills andblock bills
were highly liquid banking assetseligible for rediscount, their sub-
stitution for special bills actually meant only a formalwithdrawal
of the latter.108
101 League of Nations. Money and Banhing 1937-38, Vol. 1, pp. 56-57.
102 League of Nations, Money and Banking 1938-39, Vol. 1, p. 56.
103 ibid., p. 58; Reichs-Iredit-GeSCIlsChaft, o. cit., p. 48.
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To facilitate the transition from short-term financing to a depend-
ence upon current revenue and long-term capital, a new type of
short-term bill, the "Treasury delivery bill" (Lie!erungsschatzanwei.
.cung), was introduced.104 This proved to be just another variation of
the short-term "prefinancing" which the Nazis had been using all
along, its most significant differences being those designed to limit
the possible credit expansion in the economy. Unlike special bills,
these Treasury delivery bills could be issued only by the Treas-
ury105 and only for six months, after which they were to be funded
out of the proceeds of long-term loans. Nor were they eligible for
rediscount, as were the special bills; they could, however, be used
as collateral for Reichsbank advances up to 75 percent of their value.
But since the interest rate charged by the central bank for advances
was 5 percent as compared with the 4 percent discount rate on bills,
whenever banks were in need of funds they would prefer to hold
delivery bills and send to the Reichsbank other bills which were
discountable.106 But the Treasury delivery bills were similar to the
special bills in that they were given in payment (usually as part of
the payment) for public works and armaments. Contractors had to
accept delivery bills in payment atpercent less than their face
value, but had to pay 3¼ percent for discounting them at the
banks.107
Originally conceived as a purely temporary measure, tile Treas-
ury delivery bills were to be issued only in amounts that could be
fully repaid at maturity, evidently by recourse to the capital market.
104 i.eague of Nations, op. cit., Vol. II. pp. 81 if.
105W. G. J. Knop in The Banker (London, May 1938,p. 123) asserts that Dr.
Schacht himself was responsible for the new instruments of finance "with the inten-
tion of creating an instrument of central financial control and in the hope that he
might be entrusted with its direction. For one of the great weaknesses of the 'special
bil1 system is its complete decentralization. 'Special bills'are issued independently
by the various government departments and all they have to do isto notify the
Reichsbank of the amount issued."Under the delivery bill system governmcnl
departments desiring to spend over and above their allotted budgets hadto apply to
the Treasury for funds. As matters turned out, however, Schachtwas not entrusted
with the direction of the new centralized policy.
106 Since Treasury delivery bills could not be rediseounted,every investment in
them tended to decrease the liquid assets of the investor. Germanbanks keep only a
small amount of cash and rely extensivelyon rediscountirig; their credit policy is
affected more by the size of rediscountable assets than bythe size of the cash reserves.
League of Nations, op. cit., Vol. 1,p. 56. -
107 Reichs-KTedit-Gesellschaft,o. cit., p. 90.
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.But the annexation of Austria, and the intensification of military
of preparations during and after the Czechoslovakian crisis in the fall
of 1938 upset all previous calculations as to revenue require-
)1 ments.'°8 The need for additional revenue, coming as it did at a
.11 time when the capital market was showing signs of tightening,'°°
it forced the Reich to issue a great deal more delivery bills than it had
anticipated. Mention has been made before of the large increase in
the volume of 4½ percent Reich long-term loans floated during the
peiiod from April 1938 to April ig. In addition, there were re-
ports that government departments - the Army in particular -
were paying for goods in "acknowledgment vouchers" that merely
e. took official cognizance of the debt. Making their first appearance in
November 1938, these vouchers were estimated five months later
at about i billion reichsmarks."°
Id ,, The circumstances which compelled the Reich to issue more de-
re livery bills than it had intended eventually led it to discontinue
their issuance. Designed as a stop-gap during what was expected to
be a transition phase in German finance, the delivery bills were not
equipped for the situation that confronted them. The era of corn-
plete dependence upon current revenue and long-term capital,
which they were supposed to usher in, never developed. Instead the
German economy found itself face to face with extraordinary rev-
s- enue requirements and dwindling sources. Anyconsiderably greater
dependence upon taxation was hardly possible during peacetime.
The capital market for "governments" had evidently deterio-
108See Reichz-Kredit-Gesellschaft, op. cit., p. 85 where explicit reference is made
in this connection to 'the incorporation of F.astmark," the "reconstruction of the
Sudetenland," the "increased armament production within the former Reich itself,"
and the "fortifications on the Western frontier."
109See Wochenbericht desinstituts für Konjunklurforschung (Englishedition,
August 11, 1939). It is reported that the last of the 4½ percent bond issuesfloated
in 1938 was undersubscribed, and that the banks had difficulty placingtheir quotas.
There was, moreover, a decline in the quotations for 4½ percent publicand quasi-
public bonds; the index was 100.13 in April 1938, fell to 99.00 in January1939 and to
98.95 in August 1939; and might have fallen further wereit not for the open-market
operations begun by the Reichsbank in January 1939. (ibid., Germanedition, June
21, 1939 and September 15. 1939.)
110New York Times (March 5. 1939). According to thecorrespondent. about 500
million reichsmarks had been used by the recipients ascollateral for loans from banks.
The Reich gave assurances that the vouchers wouldbe honored in time. In effect




rated." The economy was too close to the limits of its productive
capacity to risk a wholesale expansion of credit through the banking
system. The condition of the German economy and of the fInancial
system, at the time of the introduction of the New Finance Plan,
is described by the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft as follows: 112"There
can be no question that the more-than-average exertions which have
been imposed upon all available economicresources during the last
twelve months are now genuinely close to their limits. Thestrains
which have made their appearance in the field of prices,incomes,
and consumption clearly point to this conclusion."
As a result the New Finance Planwas introduced on March 20,
1939, to become effective as of May i of that year.113Designed to
tap new sources of revenue, it was very detailed andcomplicated."s
The treatment here is restrictedto the more important aspects of
the borrowing program. The 41,4percent long-term Reich Treasury
bonds were no longer to be offered forsubscription in the open
market. Instead long-term loanswere to be placed directly with
institutions such as insurancecompanies and savings banks, in
amounts adjusted to the volume of long-termcapital accumulated
by them. The delivery bills, allof which fell due some time between
May and October of1939, were to be withdrawn as they matured.
In their stead was to be issuedan increased volume of non-interest.
bearing (discount) Treasury bonds,and in addition two types of
tax credit certificates resembling inname only those issued in Sep-
tember I932. It is thetax certificates which constitute the backbone
of the New Finance Plan.They are the short- andmedium.term in-
111 It is interesting to notice theeuphemisms used by Nazi publicationsto keep the outlook bright regardless of thecircumstances. The inaccessibility of thecapital market at this time is describedas follows: 'The absorbing capacity ofthe bond market was subject to fluctuationswhich became of greater importanceas the cir- culation of Reich loans increased.The State could not allow itsconsolidation require- ments to be exposed to the accidents ofsuch fluctuations....It also did not scent practical to shut off from the capitalmarket private business andother branches of public administration.... This made necessary a fundamental change in themethod of financing. The basic ideaof the new finance plan isto open the capital market more and more to private industry."Supplement to the Wochenberjchtdes Instituts für KonjunAfurfotchung (Englishedition, April 20. 1939)p. 2.
l'SReiCh1-KreditGIlschaft op. cit.,p. 4.
'llReichsgcsetzblatt (1939) 1,p. 561.
114 See, for instance,
Reichs-Kredi[.Gesellscltaft op. cit.,pp. 44.46, and F. Terhalic, 'Der Neue Fsnanzplan,'Jahrbuche, für Nationajohonomietind Statutik, Vol. 149 (1939) pp. 682 II.
52struments that continued the tradition of "prefinancing" begun in
and provided a method of borrowing that was completely in-
dependent of conditions in the money and capital markets.
Type I certificates were non-interest-bearing and could be used
at face value for the payment of all taxes and customs, seven months
after issuance. Type II, also non-interest-hearing, had to be held for
thirty-seven months after issuance before they were acceptable in
payment of taxes and customs, but were then accepted at a premium
of 12 percent, and could be used as collateral for bank loans. Prov-
inces, municipalities, the Reich, the Nazi Party, the Reich Post
Office, the Reich Railway, the Hermann Goering Works, the Auto-
mobile Road Organization, the Public Utilities, and other public
law corporations all paid for 40 percent of their orders (where the
payment was over 500 reichsmarks) in tax credit certificates, 20 per-
cent in Type I, and 20 percent in Type II. All these agencies pur-
chased their tax certificates from the Reich for cash, thus putting
at the disposal of the government any liquid assets they might have
accumulated. Ultimately the loan was made by the suppliers of
goods, which was in keeping with one of the major purposes of the
certificates, "to effect a maximum immobilization of liquid indus.
trial funds,"115 especially those funds which had previously been
used in ways considered undesirable. It seems that in spite of the
numerous direct controls over investment, labor, and raw materials,
many firms had been able to "self-finance" projects which the Nazis
would have preferred to see postponecL"6 The idea now was to in-
duce entrepreneurs to tie up in tax certificates the funds that might
otherwise be "misused."
To make the certificates a particularly attractive investment, and
to encourage entrepreneurs to hold them as long as possible, they
were assigned special characteristics. Type I certificates entitled their
holders to tax relief through an additional depreciation allowance
in their income or corporation taxes. If entrepreneurs kept them for
at least ten months, they could assign to depreciation for semi-
durable capital equipment as much as 20 percent of these certifi-
cates, thus reducing the income or corporation tax base correspond-
ingly. The rate was increased by 5 percent for every additional year,
115 Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft. o. cit., p. 45.
149 116 Supplement to the Wochenbericht de5 Inst it uts für Konjun*turforschung
(Engliih edition, August 11, 1939) p. 2.
53up to a maximum ofpercent."7 Both types were recognizedas
legal tender for payments between enterprises in industry, handi-
craft, and commerce. These enterprises were compelled toaccept
certificates from each other for 40 percent of any amount due for
goods delivered or services performed, thus making thema means
of payment within industry. They were not, however, permittedto
pass over into the field of incomes and consumption or to agricul.
Lure."8 Both types of certificates were marketable; theywere bought
and sold in over.the-counter trading and therewere official quota-
tions for them."°
It was perfectly apparent that use of tax certificatesmeant an in-
crease in the nieans of payment, but the possibility of inflationthat
had troubled the Nazis early in 1938as they approached the limits
of their productive capacitywas no longer a source of concern. They
felt that the credit expansion represented bythe certificates would
be neutralized by the expansion ofproduction in Austria and the
Sudetenland,120 and, to someextent, by the elimination of a large
part of the previous self-financing expenditures.'2'They did, how-
ever, take the precaution of specifying that thetax credit certificates
could not be discountedat the Reichsbank,'22 At the end ofigq,
there were 4,672 million reichsmarksof certificates outstanding."
"7 The special depreciation allowanceprivileges granted to the holders of TypeI certificates were worth more thati thecurrent market interest return. The Berlin
correspondent of the Statist (London, April1, 1939, p. 401) estimates that this privi-
lege was "tantamount to thepaYment of from 5 to 10 percent for the firstyear, the interest to depend on therate of income tax to which the manufactureris liable." A later issue of the Stat ist (November4, 1939, p. 484) revises the estimateto between 10 and 17 percent per annum.
118 Reichs-KreditGesellseha[to. cit., p. 45.
119 Supplement to theWochenbericht des Justiluts fürKonjtInkturfor5chung (Eng- lish edition, August II, 1939)p.I.As a result of the fall in the marketvalue of Type 11 certificates, they became highlyattractive investments, at times yieldingover 6 percent. In order to hold them, firmswere ready to increase their indebtednessto the banks, or, more often, toreduce their liquid hank balances.See also League of Nations, Money and Banking 1939-10,Vol. 1, p. 10.
120 Supplement to theWochenberjchg des Instituis fürKoniunkturforschnng (Eng- lish edition, April 20, 1939)p. 4.
121 Ibid., (English edition, AugustIl, 1939) p. 4.
122 Reference has been madeto the fact that Type 11 certificateswere eligible as collateral for Reichsbank loans.It seems likely that theiruse as collateral was per- mitted because there was noassurance that tax certificates, distributedas they were. would automatic-ally find theirway Only to enterprises liquidenough to hold them until the date of maturity.




































The outbreak of war and the inability tomaintain the market value
of the tax certificates without extensive purchasesby the Reichsbank
forced the Reich to discontinue them byNovember i, 1939 and
to do most of itsborrowing .thereafter through interest-bearing
Treasury bills, On April m, 1940, taxcredit certificates were deprived
of their quality of being a means ofpayment.124
The War
125
"Silent financing" is the term frequentlyemployed in Nazi litera-
ture to describe themethod of borrowing used after the outbreak
of war. The procedure was fairlysimple and was carried through
with the help of the various creditand banking institutions which
were completelydominated by the government. During thefirst
three and a half years of 125 the general public was not even
asked to subscribe to "war loans." Sinceproduction and investment
had been directly controlled for yearsand consumers' goods became
rigidly rationed when war broke out,the government evidently felt
secure in the knowledgethat the ways in which individualand cor-
porate incomes couldbe spent were narrowlycircumscribed. More-
over, an increasinglylarge part of these incomes waschanneled into
the Treasury through the tax systemwhich was amended for that
purpose at the outbreakof war and again later. Whateverindividual
or corporate income wasnot taxed away and could notbe used for
consumption or approved investmentwould, it was felt, find its
way necessarily tothe various credit and savingsinstitutions, where
it could be reached easily bythe government. Tire ReichTreasury,
in fact, tapped these sourcesregularly.It borrowed also directly
from the Reichsbank,although actually in muchsmaller amounts
than from the other creditinstitutions.
Wartime borrowing has beencarried through on a short-and
long-term basis. The short-terminstruments have beenTreasury
notes and rediscountableTreasury bills which weresold currently
to the commercialbanks, allegedly to absorbonly the savings ac'
cumulated there. Some of the Treasuryhills and longer-term certifi-
124 Bank for International Settlements,Tenth Annual Report (1940) p.113.
125 We have used for our analysis,besides the various publicationsof the League
of Nations and other literaturespecifically quoted, the Tenth,Eleventh, and Twelfth
Annual Report of the Bank forInternational Settlements (1940, 1941.and 1942) and
Die Wirtschaftskurve, Vol. 20(1941) pp. 15354.
12* Our information covers Nazi warfinance until about thebeginning of 1943.
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Itates (discussed below) have been "purchased" by the centralbanks
and credit institutions in the 'Protectorate" of Bohemiaand Mora-
via (Czechoslovakia) and other neighboring countries.Short-tern1
loans have also been granted to the Reich by thevarious Reich
Credit Offices. These are the special banks of issuewhich, created
for the occupied territories,are "independent" institutions, but
managed by a Reichsbank official.'27 At the end ofMarch 1942, the
total amount of such loanswas estimated at 5.billion reichsmarks.
Long-term issues have consisted of marketable,interest-bearing
Treasury certificates and so-called"Li-loans" which the Treasury
has sold to savings banks, privateand public insurancecorporations,
cooperatives, etc. None of the long-term issueswere offered to the
public, no syndicateswere organized to place them. So firmwas the
hold of the Treasuryon the credit institutions that thesecustomary
procedures were superfluous. It has beenestimated that at themost
only 20 percent, and probablyless, of all the funds borrowedby the
Reich between August1939 and December 1941were supplied
directly by the public.128The earlier issues of Treasurycertificates
(March and May 1940)matured after five andten years respec.
tively; later issues (sinceSeptember 1940) aftertwenty-one years. Those issued beforei 941 paid 4 percent interest; laterissues, 31/2
percent. Li-loans were issued inbonds of twenty to thirtyyears'
maturity, and, as in thecase of the Treasury certificates, paidlower
rates of interest as time passed.The original ratewas 41,4 percent,
but declined to4 and later to 31/2 percent.
This brief analysis of theincrease in Germany'spublic debt since August i939 makes it obvious that the methods ofborrowing during the war periodwere basically no different fromthose used for the preparation of thewar: the government reliedlargely on credit institutions other thancommercial banks for theabsorption of long- term loans, and for short-termfunds on thecommercial banks, which were helped, if necessary, bythe rediscountingfacilities of the Reichsbank. Thegovernment did not wishto revive the unpleasant
memories of the war loansfloated during WorldWar I by appealing to the public for funds.
127 The two thief functionsof the Reich Credit Officeswere to provide currency for the payment of troopsand requisitionetj goods,and to facilitate thechange.over of occupied territories fromlocal to Germancurrency. 128 Bank for InternationalSettlements, Twelfth AnnualReport (1942) pp. 121-22.
56banks The system of controlled production and consumption made it
'IoTa- increasingly unlikely that any significant part of the national income
4am would be spent for purposes which might interfere with the war
Reich economy. It was not until the third year of war that the government
eated felt the need to urge an increase in the total money savings in the
but economy. To add to the forces already at work to induce savings.
2, the the decree of Octobero, 1941 concerning the "guidance of put-
riarks. chasing power" was issued, and in it the government provided in-
taring centives for increased savings by wage and salary earners and entre-
asury preneurS.129
tions, Wage and salary earners were invited to participate in a scheme
o the of "iron savings." Deducted weekly or monthly from regular wage
as the and salary payments and transferred to local credit institutions, these
)mary iron savings were originally not to exceed 26 reichsmarks a month
most for an individual. Later the maximum was raised to9reichsmarks.
y the In addition to paying current interest equivalent to thatpaid on
)phed savings deposits of at least one year's duration, iron savings were
ficates made attractive by an automatic reduction in the saver's tax liabili-
espec- ties, but they could not be withdrawn until after the war,and then
years. only upon one year's notice. The portion of an individual'sincome
s E4I
thus saved enjoyed complete exemption from theincome tax, wage
years' tax, and social insurance contributions.The exemption from the
lower income tax meant, according to estimates, that about 15-20percent
'rcent, (in some cases much more) of an individual's credit onhis iron
savings account represented a gift to him by thegovernment,'30 since
the reduction in his taxes came to approximatelythat. From the
point of view of the government, the taxreduction meant that the
war was being financed to alarger extent through borrowing and to
a smaller extent throughtaxation. The results of iron savings were
said to be rather disappointing duringthe first year of its opera-
tion, '' and when the scheme was extendedin November 1942, the
monthly revenue amounted to only 70million reichsmarks.
For the entrepreneurs there was asimilar scheme. They could
make deposits with the Treasury that wereblocked for the penod
of the war, would bear interest onlyafter the end of the war, and
12) We are describing the provisions of thedecree as amended on December 10,
1942 (Rcichsgesetzblalt, 1942, I, p. 691).
120 Bank for International Settlements, op. cit., p.122.














could be withdrawn upon application after the war for making be-
lated replacements and repairs and for replenishing the depleted
inventories in raw materials or semi-finished goods. The deposits
on blocked accounts could amount to 50 percent of a firm's depre-
ciation allowance in 1940 or, in the case of commodities,to 20 per-
cent of its holdings of raw materials and semi-finished goodsas
assessed in its tax return for 1938 (or for theaverage of 1937-39).
The depositors were to be granted certaintax privileges after the
war.
No information is available as to whether theoperation of the
scheme was considered successful. Obviouslynot satisfied withthis
voluntary scheme, the government in tile spring of1942 made it
compulsory for entrepreneurs to depositpart of their profits with
the Treasury "for the duration." 182 Allentrepreneurs whose income
amounted to at least 30,000 reichsmarksrn 1941 (around 30,000
firms) were to deposit part of that income with thegovernment if it
exceeded their 1938 income (or the 1936-38average) by at leasto
percent. Individual entrepreneurs had to deposit25, corporations
30 percent, of tile income in excess of 150 percent of their income
in the base period. The Treasurywas to decide after the war what
use to make of the funds thus accumulated. Incases of emergency,
entrepreneurs could obtain loans from the fundup to 50 percent of
their deposits at an interest rate of 31/2percent. Since the "excess"
income continued to be taxed also underthe regular income and
corporation tax laws (normal rate and surtax) thetotal curtailment
of the "excess" income (tax and deposit)was very high. The maxi-
mum was fixed at 90 percent.'33
One other scheme which thegovernment used in the fall of 1942
for obtaining funds should be mentioned,for it did not follow the
usual pattern.134 It was rathera variation on borrowing methods
used in the prewar period, methods ofcreating private debts for
the benefit of the government insteadof showing them as increases
in the public debt. Thus, instead ofthe tax on landlord's inflation
gains heretofore in effect, landlordswere compelled to make a capi-
tal payment to thegovernment amounting to ten times the annual
tax assessment. This was knownas an "equalization payment," and
132 Decree or March 31, 1942(Reichsgesefzbla:t, 1942, I, p. 162).
'33 H. W. Singer, op. cit.















was to becompleted by the end of 1942. To some extent these pay-
ments were expected to come out of funds not being used by the
landlords, and hence to mop up idle cash. But for the most part,
it was realized that landlords would have to borrow to make the
necessary payments; mortgage banks, savingsbanks, and insurance
institUtiOflS were authorized to lend funds to the landlords at 4.5
percent interest and 4 percent amortization and to issue mortgage
bonds in financing the loans. In this way the Treasury swelled its
revenue, supposedly by 8.5 billion reichsmarks, throughthe simple
expedient of increasing the indebtedness of private debtors to credit
institutions. Bank borrowing was done, not by the government, but
by private individuals who paid the money over to the Treasury,
th
thus providing the government with funds withoutaffecting the
public debt.m It is interesting to note that a landlord whoborrowed
e F the entire equalization amount due would have had to payin the
it
fIrst year an amount equal to 8 percent of his old tax,and gradually
less every year thereafter.
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ns REVENUE OF PRIVATE AND QUASI-PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS
e AS A SOURCE OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS
at Taxation and loans were not the only sources of revenueused b)
public authorities in Nazi Germany to financetheir increasing ex-
penditures.13° The Nazi government transferred many,partly old
and partly newly-created, public tasks to specialquasi-public organ i-
zations, either to the Nazi Party and its affiliates or tovarious other
allegedly independent organizations that were set upfor a specific
purpose.
In some cases, the agencies were not completely new,but old ones
redesignated for new purposes. Education, forinstance, no longer
remained the exclusive function of the publicschool system, but
was shifted in part to theHitler-Youth organization. Public welfare,
largely under the jurisdiction of local anddistrict authorities before
115 Another step to curtail public borrowing wastaken when the government
ordered that, as of October 1, 1942, advance payments onarmament orders that had
customarily been made were no longer permissible.It was estimated that such pay-
menu had amounted to 33 billionreichsmarks which meant that the increase in the
public debt in the fall of 1942 was by that amountsmaller than it otherwise would
have been (WirtschaJt reid Statuik, Vol. 23,1943, p. 105).
115After the outbreak of war, different types ofcontributions imposed upon the
invaded territories and "occupation costs" became anincreasingly important source
o( revenue to the Reich (see footnote 156).
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1933, was partly transferred bythe Nazigovernment to affiliates of the Party, e.g.,to the NS-Public Welfare andthe Winter Help.
Public functionswere also performed by other affiliatesof the Nazi Party, suchas the SA (storm troopers), theSS (special storm
troopers), the Labor Front,the Organization ofGovernment Offi- cials (Deu&ccherBeamtenbund), and theStudents Organization
(NS-Deugscher Studen ten bund), and by certain"independent' organizations, for instance,the Reich Aerial DefenseAssociation
(Reichs-LuftschutZ.BUfld) In additionto the Party and its affiliates, the Nazigovernment built up quasi-publicorganizations with spe- cilIc functions in theeconomy: it established, forexample, the Reich Food Estate(Reichsnimrsia7id) for controland regulation of agri- culture, the Organizationof Industry (Organisationder gewerb- lichen Wirtschaf 1) forcontrol and regulationof all other indus- tries, and the SupervisoryAgencies for controland regulation of foreign, and later alsodomestic, trade. Finally,the Reich Office for
Employment Exchangeand UnemploymentInsurance must be mentioned as an importantsource of revenue.
All these organizationsderived most of their incomefrom special





















Party organizationsreceived subsidies from the Reich, the state and
local governments. We havepieced together many bits of informa-
tion but the figures onwhich Chart 5 is based are necessarily largely
derived from estimates.
The revenue of the variousorganizations was derived either from
collections (Spenden) or fromcontributions, assessments and fees.
Collections were used for charitable or otherspecified purposes. In
the early days of theregime, the Nazi government acquired com-
plete cont3Ol over allcollections. The legal groundwork for the new
systemwas laid in a seriesof laws and decrees.137 The voluntary
character of collections was more orless eliminated, as terrorism and
other pressures forced allindividuals and enterprises to contribute.
Contributions 01 fees usually took theform of membership dues or
assessments. Membershipfees were paid either to Partyorganiza-
tions, to close affiliates or toother organizations of a quasi-public
character.
Collections
The Winter Help Fundproved the most lucrative collectionfor
charitable purposes. Prior to theNazi regime, relief during winter
months was provided as part ofgeneral public and private welfare
activities. The main burden wasthen borne by states, localauthori-
ties, and private associations-The Nazi governmentdiscontinued
such services by private andpublic bodies and in I9created in
their stead a huge new apparatus.the famous Winter Help.Tile
collections for the neworganization were made in cash orin kind
and were not really voluntary.Recalcitrant contributors weresub-
jected to all kinds of pressure.Entrepreneurs. for instance,found it
impossible to secure governmentorders when they did notmake
the contributions to the WinterHelp that were expected fromthem-
The greatest part of the cashcollections was derived from wages
and salaries through deductions atthe source and fromcontribu-
tions by enterprises based onturnover or income.Street collections
were also large.
Nazi Public Welfare andthe Adolf Hitler Collections werethe
two other most importantcollections for charity. TheNazi Public
Welfare's source of fundsconsisted mainly of a largecollection
throughout the Reich andseveral special solicitationsfor clothes,




food, vegetables, etc., and monthly dueson the basis of income. The
entire personnel of public agenciesand most of the employees of
private enterprises contributedto them. Contributions by enter-
prises to the Adolf Hitler Collectionamounted to .2 percent of their
total payroll above5,000 reichsmarks, with a minimum contribution
ofreichsmarks for every main office andbranch plant. In most
cases the enterprises found it desirableto contribute to these col-
lections in order tosecure government orders, or because contribu.
tions to the Adolf Hitler Collectionexempted enterprises from all
other collections except the WinterHelp and Nazi Public Welfare.
Receipts from these collectionswere not reported.
Conlrjbut ions and Fees
Membership feesmay he separated into twogroups, fees to organi-
zations and bodies not directlyconnected with the National Socialist
Party, and fees to theNational Socialist Party itselfand to organi-
zations which were eitherpart of, or closely affiliated with, the Party.
Among the former, theReich Food Estate, theOrganization of In- dustry, the SupervisoryAgencies, the Ministry ofPropaganda, and the Reich Office forEmployment Exchange andUnemployment Insurance should bementioned. The largestcontribution to the Reich Treasurycame through the Reich Office justmentioned. As
employment increased andwages and salaries rose, the receiptsof the Reich Officeconsiderably exceeded thesteadily declining benefit
payments. Since the large surpluseswere now employed by the Reich for other thanthe originalpurposes, and since practically the total amountswere used for expenditures whichwould normally appear in public budgets, theunemployment insurancecontribu- tions resembled genuinetaxes.
The income of the ReichFood Estatewas made up of member- ship dues, assessed liketaxes, and of specialadministrative fees, which assumed differentforms accordingto the purpose in view. Membership dueswere received both fromconcerns engaged in agricultural production andfrom concerns tradingin, andprocess- ing, agriculturalcommodities. However, thelargest part of the Reich Food Estate'srevenue was derived froma great variety of
special administrative fees,such as leviesto cover administrative

































example to illustrate thetechniques used: the cost ofadministration
of the CentralAssociation for Grain has been metsince November
1935through a payment by themills of one reichsmark per tonof
processed grain, whichis added to 'the price of flour.
Like the Reich FoodEstate, the Organizationof Industry enjoyed
income from different sources.All industrial and commercialenter-
prises (exceptagriculture) were made liable formembership fees to
the "Organizationof Industry."88 Sums wereraised from individual
enterprises on variousbases such as total payrollsnumber of em-
ployees or turnover.All enterprises were forced to payan entrance
fee which wassupposedly extraordinarilyhigh.'89 Moreover, the
special assessment toprovide funds for the ExportSubsidy of June
28, 1935140 alsofalls within the scope ofthe Organization ofIndus-
try. There was agreat deal of secrecyregarding these subsidies; en-
terprises were not evenpermitted to enter in theirbooks the sums
received.
A large sourceof income was theSupervisory Agencies.which
levied fees to covertheir administrative expenses.Large amounts
also werereceived by them throughspecial levies imposed upon
imports in order toadjust the prices ofcheaper importedcominodi-
ties to the pricesprevailing in thedomestic market.Another exam-
ple is the feein connection withthe supervision ofthe banking
system.14' A levywhich affected allbranches of industry wasin-
troduced during the war,the levy forcooperative economichelp
(Die Umlage fürdie GemeiniChaltshutfrder Wirtschaft).'42The
funds raised bythat levy were tobe distributed amongentrepre-
neurs whosebusiness had to beclosed during the war,but were to
be reopenedafter restorationof peace. Allindustries, with a few
exceptions such as oceanshipping wereliable for contributions
under this law.The levy wasbased on the businessgross receipts;
it was firstimposed for thefiscal year 1940-41.Numerous otherfees
were imposedupon business.
The Ministryof Propagandasecured most of itsfunds from dues
paid to the ReichChamber of Culture,from proceedsof the adver
138 ReichsgeSCtZblaht(1934) 1, p. 1193.
134 Der DeutscheVoIhsWitl (May 17,1933) p. 1511.
114 Reichsgesetzbtatt(1955) I, p. 812.
141 Ibid (1934) 1, p.1203; (1933)1. p.203.
113 Ibid. (1940) I, pp.395. 737
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tising levy, and fromradio fees. The ReichChamber of Culture
was composed of the ReichFilm Chamber, MusicChamber, Press Chamber, etc. Membershipwas compulsory for all thoseactive in the professionsconcerned. All memberswere required to pay dues which could berequisitioned as publicrevenue.
The secondtype of institution whichlevied fees partly forpublic purposes was that closely affiliatedwith the Nazi Partyor the Party itself. The LaborFront was themost important organizationof this type. Contributionswere based on gross incomeof the members. There is onlyscanty information aboutthe revenue of theNazi Party and otherParty organizations.The Party receivedfunds from membership dues and froma number of othersources such as fees for initiation,collections and lotteriesfor national work.The line of demarcationbetween Party andgovernment income andexpen- ditures is obviouslynebulous. Itwas reported "that since theParty had assumed taskswhich previously fellto the State, the surpluses of the Reich playedan important part inthe Party's incomere-
ceipts."43During thewar, the system of Partycontributions was centralized. Formerly, the receipts were distributedamong the local, regional, and Reichgroups, but after hostilitiesbegan all receipts were placed in the handsof the Reich Partycashier who planneda single
budget.'44Funds for air defensewere raised partly through membership fees paidto the Reich AirDefense Association.146In addition to these"voluntary" fees,compulsory contributionsfor air defense of largeindustrial enterpriseswere imposedupon these enterprises by the AirDefense Law of June26,1935.146The Depart- ment of Aviation coulddetermine the size ofthese Contributions. We have emphasizedbefore thegreat difficulties thatmust be faced in makingestimates of theprobable magnitudeof all these Reich revenues. Thegreatest handicap lies inthe lack of
informa. tion as to how largea part of the activitiesof the variousorgani. [ions must beconsidered functionswhich are ordinarilyperformed by governments.There is no doubtthat a great dealof their work was of such a character. Asexamples, we wantto mentionsome of the activities whichthe organizationshad assumed.One of the best 143Der Deutsche Yolkswirj(August 23, 1940)p. 1713. 144Ibid.
146In 1941, the Reich AirDefense Association had13 million mem,(New York Times, July 7, 1941).





































known was the WinterHelp whose services were indispensable.
Similarly, the Reich Food Estate, theOrganization of Industry and
the Supervisory Agenciesperformed important functions in theNazi
planned economy. Most of thesefunctions were purely public serv-
ices and were so essential tothe government that it would havehad
to finance themthrough its regular budget if the"pTivatc" receipts
had not existed. The same was true,of couTse, of the export sub-
sidies which were so vital to therearmament of Germany inmaking
the importation ofcritical raw materials possible of thelevy for
cooperative help of businessesaffected by the war which otherwise
the government would havehad to support, of the variousactivities
by the Ministry ofPropaganda, and of a great deal of thework of
the Labor Front andthe Reich Air Defense Association.
The chief importance ofthe funds collected throughall these
organizations lies not so muchin the fact that large portions may
have been directlytransferred to the Reich for usein rearmament,
but rather in the fact thatthese contributions representfor the most
part new sourcesof revenue exploited to financecustomary or new
government tasks. Withoutthese new sources the total government
borrowing would necessarilyhave been higher.
It is impossible toknow where the burden ofthese contributions
fell. Enterprisescontributed as 'well as the massesof the populatiofl
and in some cases entrepreneurswere not permitted toshift the
burden to the public.Among the enterprisesthemselves there is
some indicationthat the small onessuffered more than the large.
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